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1. Abstract
In this paper, we have proceeded back and forth between several levels of analysis (macro, semi-macro)
and periods to gain a picture as complete as possible of the Corporate Political Activity (CPA) phenomenon
in Japan. Regarding issues encountered, the variety of non-tariff measures that impede trade is a key
element for business. There used to be gaiatsu in the past, but, due to the domestic crisis, the globalization
and the rise of China, the attitudes have changed for foreign business which is now “inside the castle,”
leading to more direct interactions between business and government. Before, trade issues were central
whereas nowadays, in globalization times, the biggest problems occur from laws and legislations that have
become obsolete in regards of the technical and economic acceleration. The principal elements for CPA
emerging from our observations are : nurturing domestic allies, assessing local opposition, having strong
industry support, macro-level tools (Super 301, treaty negotiation, etc.), using intra-home country lobbying,
proposing benefits for Japan and mobilizing the media for acceptance. The use of state power is becoming
more limited whereas the technocratic rationality (as opposed to politics) on the persuasion side is widely
used with the help of local collaborative interests.
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2. Introduction
In this paper, we will examine at different levels of analysis, macro and semi-macro, how MNC conduct
their Corporate Political Activities (CPA) in an International Business (IB) context. The case of Japan was
chosen because, contrary to the US or the EU where CPA by global firms has been widely studied, research
in the discipline in this country is limited. We will limit ourselves, in this article, to the above two level of
analysis but make reference in the text to a case study published separately(1).
In the first part, we try to identify the major issues encountered by foreign firms in Japan on the basis of
several sources among which the most important consist of the publications of the representative bodies of
foreign business, the ACCJ for the US and the EBC for Europe.
In the second part, we observe how foreign business attempted to modify the regulatory environment
and exert influence in Japan, chiefly with the help of home governments and the above associations. In this
section, we rather focus on the US and the ACCJ because archival material and information were available to
a higher degree. Furthermore, we adopt a longitudinal perspective to assess how CPA modes have changed
across time.
Methodologically, we worked on various publications (ACCJ, EBC, etc.), studies and survey, but also on
interviews with firms and CPA practitioners conducted recently in Japan.
2.1. About CPA
Since the 60s an enormous amount of literature and research has been produced on the relationship
between business and government, essentially in North America academia. The issue covers interests and
actions of corporations and trade associations trying to influence legislative or regulatory processes, on a
continuous or episodic (elections) basis with activities widely known as lobbying, Political Action
Committees, contributions, coalition building, advocacy, grassroots mobilization, constituency building, etc.
The concept is generally referred to corporate political activity (CPA), business political activity, political
behavior, non-market activity with related keywords extending to corporate public affairs, political strategy,
issue management, etc.
With time, however, the term Corporate Political Activity (CPA) seems to be well established among
researchers. Therefore, we will try in this study to unify our terminology under this term though it may
happen that we also use the word “lobbying” as a proxy, especially in our interviews, for a better
1 Lobbying strategies of foreign firms in Japan, Bulletin de la société franco-japonaise de gestion, No.33, Mai 2016
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understanding by our interlocutors for which the word CPA is far from familiar. As we will see later, the
term lobbying can be strictly defined as an information strategy albeit in the common language it rather
evokes money and corruption. Money is also a CPA strategy (contribution for elections etc.) but, as a
financial strategy, ranks parallel to lobbying/information strategy under the inclusive CPA concept (Hillmann
& Hitt, 1999). Moreover, it seems that there is a difference of connotation between Europe and the US
where the term lobbying is essentially used for the provision of information by individual representing the
firms’ interests, whereas in Europe it implies political action in general.
Turning now to the definition of Corporate Political Activity (CPA), let us examine different
contributions of previous researchers. In his seminal work, Epstein (1969) makes first a critical distinction
between the most spectacular, but not necessarily the most important part of CPA, the electoral and the
governmental activities. Electoral activities with their financial contributions are the most known to the
public but are only periodic and not policy-specific from the firm point of view. More relevant are the
governmental activities usually associated with interest groups and conducted on a day-by-day basis for the
purpose of influencing, modifying, or having introduced new laws, regulations at every level (legislative,
administrative, judicial). It also includes activities intending to influence public opinion. Epstein, therefore,
proposes the following definition :
“…all interactions by business firms with the formal or informal institutions of government and all efforts by
corporations to maximize their position in society…”
Boddewyn and Brewer (1994), referring to political behavior and power relations quote : “acquisition,
development, securing, and use of power…to overcome the resistance of other actors”, ”focused on (a)
related actors located in the nonmarket environment of the firm, essentially governments, interest groups, the
intelligentsia, and public opinion and (b) a variety of actions such as compliance, evasion, negotiation,
cooperation, coalition building, and cooptation”. Baron (1995), one of the major promoters of the
“nonmarket” concept, adopts an extensive view : “the nonmarket environment includes those interactions that
are intermediated by the public, stakeholders, government, the media, and public institutions.” Others like
Getz (1997) or Bonardi et al. (2006) summarize it respectively into “any deliberate firm action intended to
influence governmental policy or process” or “coordinated actions firms undertake in public policy arenas.”
Taking into account these precursors’ clarifications, we would, drawing closely on Salorio et al. (2005),
propose the following :
Corporate Political Activities include actions taken to favorably position the firm in its nonmarket
environment, by managing those uncertainties and resources linked to the influence and/or resistance of other
market and nonmarket actors, with regard to the firm’s overall economic performance.
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3. Major issues for foreign firms in Japan
3.1. Demands from the business communities and the governments
3.1.1. In the past : a selection of themes from EBC 2000/2001 and ACCJ 2001 White Papers
The subject of CPA is broad and can encompass different levels of analysis as no database exists that
would gather and compute micro/firm level CPA activities. We, therefore, have to rely on macro-level
information such as bilateral trade and investment negotiations, semi-macro/sectoral issues as aggregated by
the foreign Chambers of Commerce in Japan or similar bodies, or surveys conducted by various actors.
Things are evolving ; some issues are solved or cease to be relevant whereas others are still identified as
problematic. As an interviewee puts it : “if one wants to find changes, he will find some ; if one wants
constants, he will find them either.” We could say that it depends on the lens adopted, the level of analysis,
and the expected results. Consequently, to follow the constants and the evolutions, we will try to
concentrate chiefly on the semi-macro level as represented by the publications of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) and the European Business Council (EBC), which form a trackable thread across
time. Other sources will naturally complement this approach.
In Table 1, we have synthesized the major topics found in the 2001 US-Japan Business White Paper
(ACCJ) and the 2000 and 2001 Reports on the Japanese Business Environment published by the EBC whose
acronym at the time stood for European Business Community. The two issues of the European side
correspond to the biennial one of the American side, the total covering the two years of 1999 and 2000. It
could have been interesting to go back further in time, but unfortunately, the documentation on the European
side is not available with the same level of detail.
The beginning of the new century is an important turning point for Japanese political economy as many
reforms engaged under the Hashimoto administration (1996-1998) such as the restructuring of the
bureaucratic system went into force in parallel with the arrival of Junichiro Koizumi in 2001. In this
context, both American and European Business communities hailed this atmosphere of reform and expressed
their support in their respective publications. A particular emphasis is put on structural reforms that are
expected to boost the ailing Japanese economy. We will see in more details in a section devoted to the
historical perspective how the foreign business stance (chiefly on the US side) has changed, but what can be
said here is that, compared to previous publications which were rather comminatory, in 2001 the tone
changes to become supportive and constructive. However, when looking at the details under the surface, we
found that the issues remain the same. Moreover, they are so similar between the Europeans and the
Americans that we discerned no point to distinguish between them and decided to unify their claims in one
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Table 1 Major topics from the 2001 US-Japan Business White Paper (ACCJ) and the 2000 and 2001 Reports on the
Japanese Business Environment (EBC)
Re
gu
la
to
ry
/re
la
tio
n
s
w
ith
th
e
go
v
er
n
m
en
t/c
ro
ss
-s
ec
to
ra
lt
op
ic
s
fo
r
fo
re
ig
n
fir
m
s Product approval Insurance, animal health, medical diagnostics, medical equipment, etc.
Regulatory burden Onerous filing and licensing requirement in diverse sectors such as health sciences,
cosmetics, telecommunications, civil aviation, shipping, etc.
Standards harmonization Acceptance of foreign data in the approval process, extension of the recognition for
medical devices, animal health products, cosmetics and other goods requiring
retesting for approval in Japan.
Regulatory transparency Lack of transparency making difficult for foreign firms to predict the consequences
of business decisions and plan for new regulatory developments (particularly the
financial sector and the tax system), bureaucratic arbitrariness, implementation of a
government-wide “no-action” letter system
Government procurement Lack of transparency and competition in a number of important sectors such as
construction, aerospace, defense
Tariffs An important barrier to trade in key sectors such as industrial materials and food
products
Taxation Corporate tax rate, tax reliefs, consolidated taxation, transparency, withholding rates,
stock options, etc.
Border control Quarantine laws, customs clearance procedure, arbitrary control (applying tariffs,
testing products, etc.), inadequate handling facilities, high costs
Legal environment Prohibition on partnerships between Japanese lawyers and foreign lawyers,
restrictions preventing foreign lawyers from advising on third country law, barriers
for transnational legal services provision
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Regulatory oversight Establishing independent regulatory authorities with pro-competitive mandates such
as the FSA in sectors such as telecommunications etc., strengthening of the Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)
Government influence in the
private sector
State-owned or state-sanctioned monopolies in areas as telecommunications, electricity,
postal savings, insurance
Commercial code, corporate
governance, corporate transactions
Strengthening of corporate governance, independent directors on company boards,
review of cross-shareholdings schemes, allowing cross-border share swaps to
facilitate M&As, reducing registration/incorporation fees and simplifying the
procedures, reforming accounting practices and enhancing disclosure to better reflect
the market value of assets and liabilities, etc.
Healthcare reform Improvement on product approval process (speed, harmonized global standards,
acceptance of foreign clinical data), adequate price setting encouraging innovation,
cost containment
Pension reform Reforming the pension schemes to make them more financially sound, improving
portability to enhance labor mobility ; implementing effectively the recently passed
Defined Contribution (DC) legislation and being careful not to set too restrictive
conditions
Labor market reform Emphasis should be put on securing labor mobility through education, retraining,
increasing of professional service providers, and further deregulation, including
immigration laws, visas and work permit to promote efficiency
single table. There might be arbitrariness and overlap in the process of aggregation, but we consider that the
resulting table gives a good general idea of the major topics foreign business complain of, many of them still
being still relevant.
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Particularly, in the category of “regulatory/relations with the government/cross-sectoral issue,” most
topics such as product approval, standards harmonization, regulatory transparency, government procurements,
border control, legal environment, etc., are still current. Regarding taxation and tariffs, even if the categories
exist as such, the content has evolved with time, and tariffs will be subject to changes with the new trade
agreements in the pipelines. The same can be said of structural reforms for which much has been done
since 2001 in many of the fields mentioned. However, structural reforms, even if welcomed by the business
community cannot be seen at the same level that the “regulatory/relation with the government” type of issues
because they concern primarily the domestic actors, are not specific to the foreign business and therefore are
not per se direct object of CPA. Similarly, foreign business frequently complains about issues such as the
high cost of business/labor/living in Japan, business practices (keiretsu , etc.), collusion, the distribution
system, etc., but these problems are less dependent on the government, and therefore target of CPA, than
market and business structures-related, which cannot be addressed with CPA only.
3.1.2. Now : NTM from EPA/FTA and TPP negotiations, cross-sectoral issues
We turn now to the present state of demands by the European and American side at the time of writing
(summer 2016). Despite many similarities between the Europeans and the Americans, whether at the cross-
cutting or sectoral level and which, to us, overweight by far the differences, it seemed interesting to
distinguish between the two essentially because the two blocs are not exactly at the same level regarding the
advance in their trade and investment negotiations. At the time of writing, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) deal has just been signed and is reaching the following step of ratification and detailed negotiations
whereas the Economic Partnership Agreement/Free Trade Agreement (EPA/FTA) with the EU is still under
discussion but expected to be in the final line. As a consequence, we took as a reference the 2015 White
Paper for the EU, which emphasizes its commitment to finalize the negotiations within the year 2016 and
present of shortlist of its top priorities. For the US side, we based our selection of topics on the latest US
Trade Representative report (National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers) for Japan (2015) and
on the Policy Statement of the US-Japan Business Council(2) published just after the TPP deal.
Historically, trade conflicts between the US and Japan were centered on the promotion of export to the
Japanese market and the sectors of semiconductors, automobiles and their components, pharmaceutical and
medical devices, wood products, etc., as well as government procurements and standards/certifications. For
cars and semiconductors, bilateral negotiations aimed at the establishment of numerical targets in terms of
2 US-Japan Business Council : The U.S.-Japan Business Council (USJBC) is a Washington, D.C.-based business
association whose mission is to support U.S. business interests in Japan and promote stronger economic ties between
the United States and Japan. The council and its member companies act for the mutual benefit of both countries ; it
has been merged in 2012 with the US Chamber of Commerce to amplify the voice of the American business
community on U.S.-Japan economic relations.
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share of the Japanese market, with limited results (Ishikawa, 2013). Today, tariffs on industrial goods in the
manufacturing sector being already very low in Japan, their elimination is not a top priority for the US but
the variety of non-tariff measures that impede trade is. By contrast, tariffs are considered essential in the
agricultural trade as well as government-controlled mechanisms and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) rules,
all key themes for the TPP. Compared to this very brief summary of the TPP spirit, the EPA/FTA with the
EU is definitely centered on the removal of non-tariff measures as the priorities stated in the Table 2 show.
Hence, we can remark that the EU side put in the initial position its demands regarding the mutual
recognition of standards, product certification, marketing authorizations and adoption of international
standards in the domains of medical equipment, environmental technology, consumer products, cars, and food.
This position and the corresponding difficulties were indeed reflected in many of our cases with several
interviewees stressing the important leverage of the EPA/FTA negotiation in their individual situation.
Turning again to the American distinctive requests, we note that they emphasize not only transparency,
which is not new but specifically the possibility for a deeper participation to policy making via advisory
councils or public comment procedures. Compared to 30 years ago when in spring 1984 the Japanese
government agreed to permit foreign representatives to participate in the advisory councils, how should this
demand be interpreted? A number of interviewees and a previous survey (Sone, 1987) indicate that indeed
participation was possible but that the difficulty was precisely to know whether, how and when the councils
would be held not to mention the language barrier, which altogether has actually limited the foreign presence
to these fora.
When considering the other cross-cutting issues, we can observe that they are not only fairly similar
between the EU and the US but also durable in time. For example, the problem of recognition of foreign
lawyers has been on the table for decades without much evolution. Regarding intellectual property, the topic
is similarly constant on the agenda but with a different focus for each side : luxury goods for the Europeans
and digital piracy for the Americans. The question of customs is equally old but seems to evolve toward a
significant reform in the coming years. According to our interviews, this is an area where foreign firms
have contributed by various inputs but not limited to them : many Japanese importers face the same
problems and have the same interests to a modification of the existing system. Finally, the government
procurements also never disappeared from the agenda ; in this field, the Americans give priority to the
construction sector whereas the Europeans try to sell their railways systems and related technologies.
Regarding the sectoral level, the major concerns for both sides, are in automotive, medical devices/
pharmaceutical, insurance, express delivery and food industries with fairly similar issues. The important
issue of Japan Post straddles on the two domains of insurance and express delivery.
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Table 2 European and American demands in 2016 based on the 2015 White Paper for the EU, the US Trade
Representative National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers report for Japan (2015) and on the
Policy Statement of the US-Japan Business Council (March 2016)
EU (EBC), in view of an FTA/EPA agreement within 2016 US (USTR＋USJP Business Council after TPP signature)
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Mutual recognition of standards, product
certifications and marketing authorizations,
and adoption of international standards, for
example in terms of medical equipment,
environmental technology, consumer products,
cars, and food.
Lifting of barriers, such as high costs and
unnecessary bureaucracy that prevent or
delay products from reaching the market –
for example, in terms of tariffs on materials
and foods, and Japan-only product labeling
requirements.
Ensuring fair competition and equal
treatment for all companies, domestic and
foreign, for example in the airline, express
delivery and insurance sectors.
Ensuring fair and open tenders for public
contracts in the railway and construction
sectors.
Improving conditions for foreign direct
investments, including the removal of
requirements unique to Japan in the
banking and asset management sectors
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Advisory Councils/Committees :
Given the opacity in the functioning of the
various advisory committees, ensure transparency
on the formation and operations of these groups.
Public Comment Procedure (PCP) :
Ensure further revisions to improve the
system such as lengthening the comment
period for rulemaking
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border M&A, ensure that shareholder interests
are protected when adopting anti-takeover
measures ; improve corporate governance by
augmenting the role of outside directors, etc.
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Recognize foreign lawyers if they are
recognized in their home jurisdiction
Other issues
Amend or abolish the restriction on branching L
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lawyers to qualify for provision of
international legal services ; limitation to
establish branch offices in Japan
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Address in a sufficient depth the issues of
counterfeit product (luxury goods) and parallel
importation, as well as adopt a tighter
definition of “for personal use.”
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Continue to improve IPR protection and
enforcement, especially against piracy in the
digital environment (technological protection,
extension of the term of copyright protection,
etc.)
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s Improve processing and facilitate treatment of
goods at the border
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Ensuring fair and open tenders for public
contracts in the railway and construction
sectors
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t Despite the WTOs GPA(3) and two bilateral
public works agreement in effect, problematic
practices such as bid rigging (“dangô”)
continue to limit the participation of US firms
in the construction sector
3 GPA : Agreement on Government Procurement
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Continuation of the Table 2
EU (EBC), in view of an FTA/EPA agreement within 2016 US (USTR＋USJP Business Council after TPP signature)
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Tariffs and quotas
Additives and enzymes
Other issues
Maximum residue levels, beef, and by-products
(casings, gelatins),listeria monocytogenes, malt,
and quota, cured meat
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Food safety (beef, food additives, gelatin, and
collagen, fungicides, residue limits) ; plant
health (potatoes)
Import policies
Rice, wheat, pork, beef, fish and seafood, high
tariffs (beef, citrus, dairy, processed food, etc.)
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Key FTA/EPA issues
Level playing field between Japan Post and private
companies (customs procedures, application of
Parking Law, inspection of quarantine related
goods)
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Unequal conditions of competition with Japan
Post (customs procedures, subsidization of
international express service, privatization)
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Key FTA/EPA issues
Fair competition and equal treatment ; complete
privatization of Japan Post ; kyôsai (4) ;
Other issues
Harmonization with global solvency ; product
approvals ; bancassurance ; Policyholder
Protection Corporations (PPC)
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Level playing field with the Postal Insurance
(access to network for private providers,
difference of supervisory treatment, cross-
subsidization) ; kyôsai ; Policyholder Protection
Corporations (PPC)
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Key FTA/EPA issues
Removal of requirements unique to Japan in
the banking and asset management sectors
(banking agency system etc.)
Other issues
Avoid unnecessary administrative burden
(multiple supervision) ; information sharing ;
globalization of operational platform in asset
management, etc.
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Reforms in the areas of online financial
services, defined contribution pensions, credit
bureaus, sharing of customer information ;
transparent practices and written interpretation
of Japan’s financial laws.
Te
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s
Key FTA/EPA issues
True mutual recognition of product certifications ;
increase the scope of products covered by
SVCs(5).
Other issues
Creation of an independent regulator ; fair
competition ( NTT ) ; harmonization of
spectrum for IMT(6) systems
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Dominant carrier regulation (NTT continues
to dominate the “last-mile” connection on
fixed-lines). No use of auction in allocating
spectrum for mobile wireless licenses
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Key FTA/EPA issues
Harmonization of technical standards and
certification procedures on the basis of UN
Regulations, elimination of unique Japanese
requirements ; take further measures to make
it possible for European compact and
subcompact cars to compete on a level
footing with kei-cars
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A variety of non-tariff barriers to be
addressed :
Transparency (opaque regulatory process,
standards, and certification, extension of the
Preferential Handling Procedure (PHP) ,
zoning rules for vehicle distribution and repair
facilities
4 Kyôsai : according to the FSA, a scheme, formed by residents in the same region or persons engaged in the same
occupation, which provides a certain amount of benefits from the pooled financial contributions of the membership for
disaster, death or accident. Kyôsai are categorized as regulated Kyôsai (established by specific laws) and unregulated
Kyôsai (without specific law for establishment). Regulated Kyôsai are exempted from Insurance Business Law, their
business operations are under the special laws and supervision of each responsible authority. Unregulated Kyôsai are
not considered to conduct insurance business as long as Kyôsai target specific groups of persons.
5 SVC : Supplier’s Self Verification of Conformity
6 IMT : International Mobile Telecommunications
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Continuation of the Table 2
EU (EBC), in view of an FTA/EPA agreement within 2016 US (USTR＋USJP Business Council after TPP signature)
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Medical devices :
Key FTA/EPA issues
Shorten the time required for equipment
examination ; harmonize clinical evaluation
with ISO 14155, mutual approval and
alignment of Quality Management System
(QMS), etc. Predictability of the reimbursement
system must be improved.
Pharmaceuticals :
Pricing system (continuation of innovation
premium and the current biennial repricing
system, abolition of the 14-day prescription
rule) ; extend the scope of the Existing
Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for
EU and Japanese Good Manufacturing Practice
(GMP) S
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Medical devices :
Eliminate Foreign Average Price (FAP) rule
for medical device evaluation ; stable
reimbursement policy (see below)
Pharmaceuticals :
Predictable and stable reimbursement policy
(continue the current biennial repricing system,
make permanent the innovative premium
program), abolish the 14-day prescription rule,
further harmonize on international standards in
clinical developments and trials. In general,
accelerate the review time to reduce the
approval lag.
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Key FTA/EPA issues
Harmonize quasi-drug and cosmetic ingredients ;
abolish import notification and accept electronic
customs clearance
Other issues
Reform of the quasi-drug approval system
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Reform of the premarket approval system of
the so-called medicated cosmetics classified
as quasi-drugs under the Pharmaceutical
Affairs low. Furthermore, restrictions on
advertising and complex import notification
procedures also are problematic
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Despite bilateral agreement between some
European countries and Japan, the
materialization in terms of procurements or
industrial partnership remains limited
D
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se
Despite contracts won by US firms, many
contracts for defense equipment are not open
to foreign bid
3.2. Surveys from firms
Although the demands expressed in the ACCJ, USTR or EBC documents emanate principally from firms
on the ground, they are aggregated with certain priorities to serve as leverage by and toward the respective
governments. To examine with a maybe close but also wider lens what kinds of problems firms encountered
in Japan in the past, we have searched for surveys and selected three conducted at different points of the time.
The results are shown in Figure 1. Attention should be paid to the fact that the questions asked are not
exactly the same across surveys as they were organized by different entities, but the essence was similar :
which factors inhibit greater trade with Japan, features that affect success or problems encountered with
respect to the Japanese government. Consequently, responding firms also indicate factors rather related to
structural issues or business practices such as the distribution system or the high cost of Japan. We have
distinguished these types of answer to highlight the issues more closely related to our research and found that
across surveys, the regulatory environment, the standards/specifications/technical requirements, the taxation
system and the customs clearance procedures stand at the top of firms’ difficulties in doing business in Japan.
Despite certain vagueness and broadness in the terms for the items regulation/regulatory environment, the
results of these surveys show a good correspondence with the ACCJ or EBC documents and continuity in
time. This is not really surprising but gives a certain level and proxy of quantification to the issues the most
encountered and perceived as difficulties, maybe needing CPA in priority.
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AT Kearney 1991 Khan, Yoshihara 1994 US JP Business Council 1997
Government regulations
Intellectual property protection
Uneven enforcement of regulations
Product testing regulations
Government procurement practices
Tariffs and quotas
Lack of financing
Controlled distribution channels
Non-market driven pricing
Lack of market opportunities
Regulations and/or administrative guidance
Taxation system
Custon clearance procedures
Many non-tariff barriers
Foreign exchange, foreign trade control laws
Intellectual property protection
Difficulties for loan and credit from gvt suppo
Government procurements
Regulatory environment
Standards and specifications
Technical requirements
Taxes
US/JP trade agreements
Tariffs
Intellectual property protection
Custom clearance
Import quotas
Government procurement
High cost of land, office rental
High labor costs
Japanese business practices (keiretsu)
Acquisition rules and practices
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Figure 1 Comparison of three surveys related to firms difficulties in Japan ; figures express the percentage of surveyed
firms facing this specific issue. Sources : AT Kearney “Trade and Investment in Japan : The Current
Environment” (June 1991) ; Khan S.and Yoshihara H. “Strategy of foreign companies in Japan”, Quorum
Books (1994) ; Japan-US Business Council/US-Japan Business Council Special Joint Task Force “Attribute of
Success of American Companies in Japan”, ACCJ (1997)
To be fair, it must also be noted, however, that in many of these studies that try to identify the reasons
for problems of performance by foreign firms in Japan, the Japanese side is not the only one to be taken into
account. They generally also underscore that many foreign firms are unable or unwilling to modify their
product to suit the Japanese market, have low-quality products, lack market research, lack pre- and post-sale
services, lack an understanding of Japanese customs, pay too much attention to financial targets with a short-
term management perspectives etc. (Khan and Yoshihara, 1994). These issues seem to be unrelated to the
relationships with the Japanese government and therefore CPA, but when the problem concerns, as often,
products approval and/or standards for example, and when the firms have a global strategy not willing to
produce a Japan-only version for cost reasons, there indeed may be CPA, often conflictual, to obtain access
to the Japanese market.
3.3. Focus on the Non-Tariff Measures
3.3.1. NTM : Technical barriers to trade, sanitary-phytosanitary, standards/conformity assessment
Next, in our attempt to refine the whole picture of possible CPA issues, we focus on a study made by
Copenhagen Economics (2009) to assess the existing barriers to trade and investment between the EU and
Japan previous to the start of EPA/FTA negotiations. Tariffs being low in Japan, except for agricultural
goods, the major question was : what explains the relatively low level of trade with the EU. The focus
came to the Non-Tariff Measures (NTM) that have been quoted for a long time in various documents as seen
above, but the real problem was to identify precisely, classify and quantify them, which has rarely been done,
and this is why this study is interesting.
Before going into the details, we will examine the concept of NTM to get a better understanding of its
implications. Table 3 represents the latest classification established by the UNCTAD Multi Agency Support
Team (MAST) and can be considered the most complete to date.
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Table 3 Major Non-Tariff Measures ; adapted from UNCTAD International Classification of
Non-Tariff Measures (2012 Version)
Technical
measures
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures
Technical barriers to trade
Standards and technical requirements
Conformity assessment requirements
Pre-shipment inspection and other formalities
Non-technical
measures
Contingent trade-protective measures
Non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and quantity control
Price-control measures, including additional taxes and charges
Finance measures
Measures affecting competition
Trade-related investment measures
Distribution restrictions
Restrictions on post-sales services
Subsidies (excluding export subsidies)
Government procurement restrictions
Intellectual property
Rules of origin
Exports Export-related measures
Of this, Copenhagen Economics retains for Japan the categories of technical measures, border
procedures, distribution restrictions, pricing and reimbursement rules, public procurement, intellectual
property and other measures. The types and importance of NTMs vary across industries : border procedures
are more important for exporters of perishable food products or express delivery whereas pricing and
reimbursement rules are essential for pharmaceutical and medical devices.
An important point is that the difference in regulatory environment understood in terms of standards,
technical regulations and conformity assessments, often quoted as the most important for international
business, cannot be removed simply by identifying them as such, and by arguing that they impede trade.
These regulations are established by governments to protect the health, safety and well-being of citizens and
the environment ; the essential question and difficulty are to determine whether a norm serves the public
interest or protectionism. Many times, both are true in varying degree which leads to conflictual and
unsolvable CPA, both sides being right. An interviewee explains that the differences in norms do not
necessarily reflect ill will but simply a different scientific history with independent development. Standards
are therefore simply different which can be conceptualized under the two subtypes of horizontal and vertical.
The vertical dimension implies a different degree of stringency relative to the quality of products, low or high.
The horizontal one only indicates that standards are different without the nuance of stringency, and they are
probably the more common.
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With these distinctions in mind, we can now examine the findings about Japanese NTMs as identified by
Copenhagen Economics. Out of the 215 issues found in their study, 194 were NTM related, of which 99 in
manufacturing, 62 in services, 29 cross-cutting, and 4 in agriculture. Furthermore, a deeper analysis focused
on the locus of solvability shows that issues solvable with traditional trade policy instruments such as treaties
are a minority. Indeed tariffs and taxes can relatively easily be removed as it has been done for decades in
the case of Japan, but the majority of problems need a domestic reform or a combination, which complicates
the situation greatly and explain why international
trade and investment treaties are barely sufficient
and often found inefficient. This is precisely
where the locus for CPA can appear when firms
must engage actions on the domestic market,
sometimes with the help of their government and
of the pending treaties in negotiation, to have their
products and services marketed.
In manufacturing the most numerous issues are
found in pharmaceuticals, food, office/IT and
automobiles (82/99) with the majority (59/82) of
them solvable only with a combination of domestic
and international action (Figure 2). Classified by
nature, the most frequently mentioned issues are
related to Technical measures : Technical barriers to
trade (65/99) and Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (12/99). The majority (65%) of these
Technical measures concern Conformity assessment,
that is, certification, testing, quality system
registration, inspection, etc. By industry, these
Technical measures are concentrated similarly in
pharmaceuticals, food, office/IT and automobiles
with nearly half in pharmaceuticals and food (44/99).
For services, the financial sector dominates
followed by communication services and insurance.
Here again, a combination of international and
domestic policy is required for a solution (Figure
3).
Figure 2 NTM by industries and locus of solvability :
manufacturing ; Unit : number of issues ; Source :
Copenhagen Economics (2009)
Figure 3 NTM by industries and locus of solvability :
services ; Unit : number of issues ; Source :
Copenhagen Economics (2009)
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4. Evolution in time and changing paradigm for CPA modes
After having focused on the issues encountered by foreign business in Japan at a semi-macro level, we
will now, for a while, step back again and have a brief look at the history of US-Japan economic
relationships at a macro level. Then we will examine at a semi-micro level the impacts on the ACCJ
activity in Japan as well as the changes that occurred in the foreign business-politics relationship. In the
light of our micro data, we will operate back and forth between the different levels of analysis to identify the
trends and patterns that have emerged the last twenty years.
4.1. A brief history of US-Japan intergovernmental economic relationship
A 1991 A.T. Kearney report analyzes the changing patterns of US-Japan trade and investment relations
every decade between 1950 and 1980 as, in historical order, benefactor, facilitator, critic up to the 80s where
Japan become a competitor. From 1990 on, the question is left open : partner or protagonist? With the
temporal hindsight, we have at least part of the answer that could be described as a mix between the two, but
the most significant crossroad for our purpose seems to be from the end of the 90s to the beginning of the
2000s, where foreign business-politics relationships will enter a new stage, driven by factors not depending
solely on both countries.
From around 1950, many legal and regulatory changes took place between the two countries beginning
with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (1949) as well as the Foreign Investment Law
(1950) in Japan ; we will just briefly summarize here the major steps from the 80s until now(7).
In 1985 the Reagan administration introduced, with Prime Minister Nakasone, the first multi-sector
negotiating framework, the Market Oriented Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks with an initial coverage of four
sectors with potential for US exporters : telecommunications, medical equipment and pharmaceutical,
forestry products, electronics, auto parts being added after. Agreements were reached for each of them but
with mixed results for US firms in terms of export increase. The Structural Impediment Initiative (SII)
(Bush/Uno) was launched in 1989, targeting a broad range of Japanese policies, practices and structural
factor working as NTM for US firms. The newness lied in the target of barriers cited not only by American
actors but also by Japanese ones (academics, business, etc.), which reinforced the credibility and potential of
acceptance. Domestic economic topics such as land policy (high prices), keiretsu, cartels, etc. that were not
included in bilateral negotiation until then were thus approached with mixed success, the most representative
one being the modification of the Large-Retail Store Law benefiting to Toys R Us.
7 Cf. Cooper W.H., “US-Japan Economic Relations : Significance, Prospect, and Policy Options”, February 18, 2014,
Congressional Research Service.
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With the Clinton administration’s New Economic Partnership, sector-specific as well as macro and
structural issues were addressed, with the obligation to meet twice a year for a review of progress based on
objective criteria. This element was intended to measure Japan’s fulfilling of its obligation but proved to be
highly controversial as the Japanese side did not agree to be quantitatively bounded, which resulted in
tensions between both countries. Although agreements were reached in many areas (medical equipment
procurement, intellectual property rights, financial services and insurance, etc.), frustration heightened for US
exporters and investors due to the feeling that the same obstacles, supposed to be already solved, were still in
place, leading to the peak of trade frictions. The Japanese answer to this “result-oriented” strategy was that
private sector practices do not obey to the same logic as government policies.
After the auto agreement in 1995, this framework was closed and replaced in 1997 by the Enhanced
Initiative, less formal and focused on an exchange of views without result- oriented requirements. The
issues of that time were centered on telecommunications, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, financial
services, etc. As mentioned above, this period of the late 90s is essential because representing a turning
point in the relationship between the two countries where the interests shifted from economics to national
security issues, due to many factors among which the globalization, the rise of China, the protracted
economic stagnation and financial crisis in Japan creating an opportunity for a surge in inward FDI, etc.
In 2001 (Bush/Koizumi) the Economic Partnership was formed around several Initiatives and Dialogues,
and including subcabinet-level leaders, members of the business communities : the Regulatory Reform and
Competition Policy Initiative, the Financial Dialogue, the Investment Initiative, the Trade Forum, etc. In
2010 (Obama/Kan), the Economic Harmonization Initiative (EHI) was established as a framework similar to
its predecessors to discuss the pending issues with several working and high-level meetings. However, since
2011, the TPP has replaced the preceding framework for bilateral issues.
4.2. The ACCJ approaches through times in the context of intergovernmental negotiations
We now focus on the activities of the ACCJ, that is, the American business community in Japan, and its
perceptions, on the background of the above intergovernmental negotiations as witnessed by its publications
or the interviews of former or active concerned persons. It would have been interesting to follow the
evolution of the EBC in parallel, but this was not possible due to the lack of archives.
We begin with the publication called “Making Trade Talks Work,” a major issue of the late 1990 and
published in parallel with other more traditional booklet such as “US-Japan Trade White Paper.” As
mentioned above, the background consists of a high level of acrimony after a peak had been reached in trade
frictions, together with the recent establishment of the WTO and widely shared opinions that multilateral
negotiations represent the future. From the ACCJ point of view, the perspective is slightly different because
Corporate Political Activities of MNC in an International Business Context : the case of Japan － 285 －
anchored in the daily Japanese business realities, leading to the launch of this publication that intends to scan
all the agreements to date, to assess whether or not and to what extent they are implemented, and whether or
not Japan is fulfilling its obligations, in the spirit of the above “result-oriented” strategy. Consequently, and
for the first time, a comprehensive review of trade agreements since 1980 was undertaken with a qualitative
and quantitative assessment. The exercise was conducted only twice, in 1997 (45 agreements) and 2000 (63
agreements) due to the burden it represents and, time passing, the change of focus by the business
community.
The first observation that can be made is that between 1997 and 2000 the general tone has changed
considerably, evolving from a hard to soft approach. In the 1997 version, the US should have “bottom-line
objectives clearly in mind and stand firm”, “avoid vague terminology”, “include specific terms, goals, and
objective measurement criteria for how agreements will be implemented and reviewed” (p13) because
“achieving a written accord often isn’t enough ; what has been agreed sometimes gets forgotten, ignored, or
reinterpreted by the other side” (p14). According to the ACCJ, “…no US Government agency has a readily
accessible list of all US-Japan trade agreements or their complete texts. This may indicate that it has often
been more important for the two governments to reach agreements and declare victory than to undertake the
difficult task of monitoring the agreements to ensure their implementation produces results.” (p14). “Despite
many recent changes in Japan economic system…Japanese government interventions in the economy remain
among the most extensive of any OECD country. Despite years of negotiation over market access and the
expressed desire by Japanese officials for real deregulation of their economy, the breadth and depth of this
study demonstrate the enormity of the access and deregulation problems that remain.” (p16). Thus, from the
ACCJ point of view at ground level, intergovernmental negotiations are one thing and real world a very
different dimension that needs to be more than ever firmly addressed. In the concluding section, the
following recommendations can be found : “the US government should be more aggressive in finding and
nurturing allies with common views and interests…(third-country parties and Japanese domestic
constituents)”, “keeping the pressure on the Japanese to make good on their promises is paramount” (p148-
149).
Compared to this, in the 2000 version, not only had the tone changed but also the landscape. First,
regarding the evaluation of the trade agreements, a final score of 53% of them is found fully or mostly
successful but with variation across industries : significant improvement in services, little or no change in
manufacturing. Second, a new playing field and new rules are materializing driven by three major factors :
dramatic changes in Japan, trends in the world economy and globalization strategy of firms. In Japan, the
combination of the domestic economic and financial crisis with the Asian crisis have revealed its structural
weakness and forced changes in important policies, especially in the financial sector where, in the preceding
years, a record number of mergers and acquisitions has occurred in ailing institutions with a significant
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amount of foreign takeover in the absence of domestic savior. Although perceptible changes in labor
flexibility, corporate structures, and governance are noticed, the 1997 remark that government intervention
scores among the most extensive of any OECD country, is considered still valid with “some plans devised in
the name of deregulation look more like re-regulation when examined up close” (p18).
As a result, a new strategic concept, “inside the castle” (p18) emerges around that time, reflecting a
breakthrough in the manner foreign firms do business in Japan still valid today. It is not sure exactly how
and when it was coined, but the metaphor suggests that, whereas most US firms were basically working from
outside the Japanese economy, they are now moving quickly “to take advantage of new opportunities offered
by the so-called Big Bang financial reforms.” They adopt strategies “to grow their business with Japanese
partners or, more notably, through wholly-owned direct investments” (p18). The phenomenon is however
limited to certain industries when construction, telecommunications equipment, building products, sea
transport, paper, and agricultural products report little progress.
Consequently, the major lessons drawn here are that it is most effective to deal with trade barriers in
Japan when the US government can align with domestic or global trends, have strong industry support, bring
other leverage as Super 301 and receive the Congressional support of effective industry lobbying (p19).
When leverage is weak, the industry divided, or when the barriers protect strong local constituency, bilateral
negotiations are less effective (p19). Finally, the concluding remarks stress that emphasizing the benefit to
Japan and work closely with the media (on both side of the Pacific) for social and political acceptance, are
key elements for success.
We then have here all the major elements we have synthesized from our case study : nurturing domestic
allies, assessing local opposition, having strong industry support, macro-level tools (Super 301, treaty
negotiation, etc.), using intra-US lobbying, proposing benefits for Japan and mobilizing the media for
acceptance. These elements still form the core of CPA strategy as we have seen, at least for the US side.
The fact that they are explicitly synthesized in this 2000 version can be said to represent a landmark in the
evolution of US-Japan economic relations.
The same change of atmosphere can be noted in the parallel publication of the US-Japan Business White
Paper (2001) newly renamed from the previous US-Japan Trade White Papers because now, “the focus of
America’s business interest in Japan has shifted significantly from trading with Japan to doing business in
Japan” (p13). Notably, “as more and more American firms operate inside the castle, with or without
Japanese partners and employing large numbers of Japanese workers, they are increasingly participating
directly in the Japanese policy process. American firms thus can become a part of the domestic naiatsu
(inside pressure) process for change. In fact, the American business community in Japan has become a
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positive agent for change through the exercise of both external and internal forms of advocacy, or to coin a
phrase, nai-gaiatsu” (p16). Examples are given of this new naiatsu or nai-gaiatsu strategy such as the
common advocacy operations by American and Japanese firms following the bilateral agreement to lower
NTT’s interconnections rates or the common actions for legal and tax changes to allow the broader use of
stock options or the support for introducing defined contribution pension (p16).
Further in time, the 2006 ACCJ Business White Paper, significantly titled “Sôri Kyôsei” (Working
together, winning together), explains in its introduction that its aim is to provide an overview of the business
environment in Japan, consistent with the ACCJ’s mission as “a supporter of reform…Kaikaku Oendan ,” its
objective not to make “demands” but to offer the best proposals and constructive requests” in a dialogue with
the Government of Japan. This spirit is similarly epitomized in the ACCJ’s Core Advocacy Principles
stating that “policy recommendations should be constructive, solution-based, cost-effective and founded on
sound analysis” with “win-win solutions.”
Recently, the ACCJ stopped publishing these kinds of cross-sectoral Business Paper to focus on specific
issues of interest in the above proposal and solution based-spirit, namely in the Health Care and Finance
fields.
As several interviewees having participated and experienced this evolution witness, at the time of the
first Making Trade Talks Work (1997), the focus was on monitoring, checking, and evaluating the result of
gaiatsu , and the implementation of trade talks. However, confronted with the lack of effectiveness and the
evolution of the environment, this work has been conducted twice only and abandoned ; nowadays no one
would be thinking of doing an updated version because much progress has been made in the castle. The
Health Policy White Paper, for example, is a good witness to this evolution. In the 80s the focus would
have been on tariff reduction for medical equipment, reduction of approval period, etc. whereas the recent
versions are intended to provide broad and mutual benefit recommendations from the patient point of view.
As one of its major authors explains, the Diet members do not want to hear about specific drug or device
from firm A or B ; they want to have the total picture of diabetes, of breast cancer, etc. To meet this
demand, the White Paper, disease by disease, define the problems, talk about the current policy, talk about
the solutions, plus the specific next steps that all incorporate the devices, the services, the diagnostics, the
pharmaceuticals, etc. in one picture without advocating for a specific company or country. However,
according to this source, the White Paper does not treat the pricing or regulatory facets that are managed by
specific entities (Phrma, Amdd etc.). Nonetheless, it seems to be widely appreciated, especially by
politicians belonging to parliament committees related to health, labor or welfare and that do not have a
medical background, that is, about 70% of them. And finally, even if it is not read by the majority of
politicians, it can serve as perfect access good to meet ministers or any targeted people even with a different
purpose.
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To finish on the ACCJ approach and the related perceptions, we can also say a word about the external
factors that contributed to this transformation, the biggest being the rise of China as an economic superpower.
For the US government as well as firms, China offered much more challenges and opportunities than the
stagnating Japanese market, for which the actors have begun to realize with time that resistance to reforms
would last longer than thought. The investment in time, energy and money could therefore not be worth in
the light of the expected return. As an interviewee puts it, in some way, Japan disappeared from the screen
in those years where new technologies and business models have enabled corporate activities to become
increasingly borderless. As the introduction of 2006 Business White Papers indicates, the priority between
Japan and the US has shifted to cooperation on security matters given the threat posed by global terrorism
and the development of nuclear arms by North Korea.
4.3. About the role of gaiatsu
We have described above the shift that occurred from US-Japan intergovernmental negotiations
accompanied by gaiatsu , apparently not always efficient, to a direct interaction pattern between industry/
foreign business and the Japanese government. There is an abundant literature about gaiatsu , and we cannot
discuss it all in detail here, but we would like to make some remarks about its efficiency and the manner it
was utilized by domestic actors, drawing on the researches of previous analysts.
In a study devoted to the interplay between the domestic and the international level of bargaining, Schoppa
(1993, 1997) examines why gaiatsu succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others. In his conclusion, he
argues that “gaiatsu will tend to produce the most positive results when these strategies resonate with
domestic politics in certain ways.” In other words, there are cases where domestic actors used external
pressure to push their internal agenda. He gives the example of reforms requested by the US in the SII
framework, in which success was seen in the distribution system (Large-scale Retail Stores Law) and the land
policy reform (tax and regulation) because certain domestic interests were supporting it (record number of
application for opening of large stores) and despite a strong opposition. On the contrary, the issue of
keiretsu went nowhere due to the lack of domestic support and the opposition of all the actors, the business
community, economists, bureaucrats, etc.who defended the status quo unanimously as economically rational
and not overly exclusionary. In the same vein, Encarnation and Mason (1990) examine the Japanese
response to US demands for capital liberalization and argue that Japan agreed to allow selective cases of
foreign investment only when domestic constituencies supported it actively. They challenge the consensus
that foreign pressure was the principal cause of Japan’s capital liberalization and suggest that this was
mediated by Japanese oligopolists in search of assets and skill controlled by foreign firms.
These studies represent only a few example but show that, although gaiatsu was widely used up to a
point as we have seen, it was not necessarily successful neither straightforward. It might have been used by
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domestic interests and even orchestrated by some governmental factions to advance their agenda. In this
sense, the evolution of the ACCJ approach to advocacy may well also reflect a deeper understanding of this
facet of the Japanese society.
4.4. Other insight from previous surveys
A few other studies offer a view of lobbying in Japan in the past. The first one is a survey conducted
by the Sone Yasunori Kenkyukai (Keiô University) in 1987 targeting foreign companies in Japan (85
responding). This survey is one of the few quantitative studies on the subject, and, as such, frequently cited
in related researches, notably in the works of Yutaka Tsujinaka, sometimes in association with Peter
Katzenstein (1995).
In essence, the Sone survey finds that foreign firms in their majority put emphasis in the bureaucracy
and that few lobby the Diet members directly (8.2%). Only 21.2% have set up a devoted Government
Relation section. 28.2% of them have hired a retired bureaucrat while 14.1% are sending personnel to the
advisory or other consultative committees. 84.7% joined a Japanese industry association. Regarding the
efficiency, 44.7% of the firms find that the Japanese industry associations are a good vector to convey their
voice to the administration but that their home government and related institutions (embassies, chambers of
commerce, etc.) are slightly more efficient (48.2%). However, their first purpose to join a Japanese trade
association is obtaining information for nearly 80% of them.
The other study found has been conducted by a committee of the US House of Representative in 1991.
Unfortunately, for logistic reasons it had not been possible to access it directly ; therefore the results reported
here are taken from the works of Katzenstein and Tsujinaka (1994, 1995) which are quoting it. According
to them, the surveyed American firms (130) are aware of the importance of public opinion and the media but
attach less importance to politicians, rather exchanging information with bureaucratic agencies for 45% of
them. 12% offer positions to retired bureaucrats and 30% send representatives to advisory committees.
Regarding the Japanese industry associations, 61% of the firms report having joined one, with a strong focus
on establishing personal contacts (60%) or obtaining marketing related information (49%). 26% of the firms
declare to have a dedicated section for lobbying. However, concerning usefulness, the USTR, and the
American embassy score respectively at 57% and 41%, reflecting a reliance on home government whereas
the efficiency of Japanese industry associations on this point ranks low at 36%.
These two surveys give an interesting quantitative picture of the late 80s-early 90s which is by many
points not very different from what we could have learned through our research at different levels of analysis.
They reveal a clear propensity to interact chiefly with the bureaucracy and limited resort to the elected
politicians or the public opinion.
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A first slight gap with our main findings could be the level of adhesion to Japanese industry associations.
In our cases, interviews and the literature studied, the Japanese industry associations were generally barely
judged worth to join because of the time and energy required in the light of the return gained. We must
remember that in our case study(8), many industries have established their own association ; this may be the
first explanation : with more industries, the result could have been different. The second point may be that
in the two surveys the major interest of joining a local association lays in obtaining information, not in CPA
efficiency.
However, the most striking difference with our findings is the rate of firms sending a representative to
advisory committees. Again, according to our cases, interviews and the literature studied, the effective
participation to advisory committee is seen as something recent and still limited in scope. The participation
process used to be closely controlled by the bureaucracy. The simple disclosure of meetings schedules or
minutes has been only recently rendered transparent and easily accessible, online for example. According to
some press articles(9), there had been a willingness from the government to open the participation of
foreigners in the heights of economic frictions to ease them somewhat. In March 1984, the Japanese
government led by Mr. Nakasone agreed after long debates to allow foreign representatives in these councils
where the Japanese industrial policy is discussed. A few articles relate this evolution, but many stress that
the bureaucracy, as well as the Keidanren, were strongly opposed to it. Moreover, foreigners would only
have the right to express opinions or testify, not to participate in decision-making, thus rendering doubtful the
real impact of the measure which should rather be taken as symbolic. Indeed, no echo of this proposal is
seen in the press for the following years until August 1990 where three foreigners are reported appointed to
an advisory council to the Office of Trade and Investment Ombudsman (OTO) in the wake of SII talks and
still without the right to decision-making. Therefore, the difficulty is to assess the extent of this evolution.
More research is needed to explain this figure, but the material is limited now and in the past. There might
have been attempts to participate more in the late 80s with firm sending people, but the question remains :
for what results and for how long? Furthermore, as there are a plethora of consultative and studying
committees in Japan, is the survey’s question effectively understood in the same sense and does it cover the
same realities that we are discussing here? Nonetheless, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the
possibility of a real and effective participation in the advisory councils is still a key issue for the Americans
nowadays.
8 Lobbying strategies of foreign firms in Japan, Bulletin de la société franco-japonaise de gestion, No.33, Mai 2016
9 The New York Times, March 12-13 1984, October 31 1984 ; The Wall Street Journal March 13 1984 ; Reuters,
August 13 1990.
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4.5. Final and synthetic remarks : shift to persuasion and collaboration
To conclude on the question of evolution in time, we will first refer to the witness of several
practitioners. First, regarding the level of gaiatsu , according to an interviewee, a real change seems to have
occurred, compared to the 80s and 90s. In those times, there were real economic friction problems that had
to be solved at states level, but now, it seems to be only a matter of fine tuning. This implies that the
USTR cannot be mobilized for every small issue. They used to do much gaiatsu in the past and do not
want to be accused of doing some nowadays. Moreover, as a bureaucratic agency, the USTR seeks
rationality as well as efficiency and therefore ask firms to speak with one voice and set up priorities among
the hundreds of issues submitted, so that the problems it will advocates are really worth to take the risk to
damage the relationship with the Japanese government. Home governments are not almighty ; they have
their own priorities and one of their major functions nowadays is to open doors, although it might not be
sufficient. However, some firms still want to use gaiatsu and push for it, but the only result is often to
deteriorate the relation with the Japanese authorities as in the Pay Pal case.
Regarding the content, the focus has also changed. Before, trade issues were central whereas nowadays,
in globalization times, the major problems occur from laws and legislations that have become obsolete in
regards of the technical and economic acceleration. Many issues are therefore related to the modernization
or adaptation of old regulations to new products or services.
In this sense, the role of the intermediate bodies such as the ACCJ or the EBC also receives a mixed
appreciation. A practitioner speaks of a double structure, where the association publishes position papers
and expresses firms’ demands but only on the basis of the lowest common denominator, whereas the real
lobbying is conducted as an individual interaction that can be done only step by step and patiently in Japan.
These collective entities serve more as communication or networking tools than real influence.
Another point noted by a practitioner is the rise of transparency and professionalization of CPA. In the
past, lobbying frequently used to offer special favors to officials, dinners, golf or money as well as
mobilizing personal networks from the same region or university. As mentioned above, in the 80s or 90s
the advisory committees never published their minutes whereas now the information is open.
Generally speaking, foreign business became more effective and works directly with the Japanese
industry and government to achieve goals related to advocacy. Again, the same practitioner explains that
this owes much to economic evolution with the Japanese industry facing the same problems in the world than
the American, which was not the case in the 80s. As he puts it : “collaboration suddenly became possible.”
The same sound can be heard at the Keidanren where there used to be a specific committee for foreign firms
twenty years ago ; that has disappeared now. In the life insurance industry where foreigners hold a
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significant market share, the person in charge for advocacy of European firms explains that the major
differences are in competition and strategy rather than in terms of Japanese firms against foreign firms.
To conclude, we draw on Tsujinaka (1994, 1995) analyzing in a comparative approach the ways and
means of foreign lobbies in Japan and the US. Questioning the means open to foreign lobbies in Japan, he
remarks that they cannot resort to the powerful and traditional constituent votes nor money, and are therefore
obliged to use the home state power, local aligning interests or the technocratic rationality consisting in
convincing the bureaucracy with the power of information, idea, and analysis. This is exactly what we have
been discussing in this study with the major findings that, now, the use of state power is becoming more
limited whereas the technocratic rationality (as opposed to politics) on the persuasion side is widely used
with the help of local collaborative interests.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proceeded back and forth between several levels of analysis (macro, semi-macro)
and periods to gain a picture as complete as possible of the CPA phenomenon in Japan. In the first part, we
focused on issues encountered and tried to identify them as perceived at the semi-macro level of the ACCJ
and EBC or the macro level of trade negotiations. At this level, tariffs on industrial goods in the
manufacturing sector being already very low in Japan, their elimination is not a top priority for the US but
the variety of non-tariff measures that impede trade is. Similarly, the EPA/FTA with the EU is definitely
centered on the removal of non-tariff measures, with particular demands regarding the mutual recognition of
standards, product certification, marketing authorizations and adoption of international standards in the
domains of medical equipment, environmental technology, consumer products, cars, and food. A study
concludes, however, that the majority of NTM are only solvable in combination with domestic reforms, trade
instrument being insufficient.
In the next part, we reviewed the evolution in times as perceived by the ACCJ and a number of
practitioners. There used to be gaiatsu and external pressures in the past, but, due to the domestic crisis, the
globalization and the rise of China, the attitudes have changed for foreign business which is now “inside the
castle,” leading to more direct interactions between business and government. Before, trade issues were
central whereas nowadays, in globalization times, the major problems occur from laws and legislations that
have become obsolete in regards of the technical and economic acceleration. Many issues are therefore
related to the modernization or adaptation of old regulations to new products or services.
Here, major elements we have synthesized from our case study are echoed at the ACCJ level : nurturing
domestic allies, assessing local opposition, having strong industry support, macro-level tools (Super 301,
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treaty negotiation, etc.), using intra-US lobbying, proposing benefits for Japan and mobilizing the media for
acceptance. The use of state power is becoming more limited whereas the technocratic rationality (as
opposed to politics) on the persuasion side is widely used with the help of local collaborative interests.
Moreover, CPA practices are becoming more transparent and professional in line with the increased
transparency in Japanese political life.
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